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On the (Continuing) Descriptive and Analytical
 
Inutility of "Spirituality"
 
Chad M. Bauman, Eugene V. Gallagher, Davina C. Lopez' 
In her response, Nadine Pence helpfully turns the conversation towards 
actual practices in teaching and the array of practical decisions that have to 
be made in the classroom and on campuses when it comes to addressing 
"Big Questions" and students' aspirations and interior lives. Several dimen­
sions of her argument are worth amplification. Pence appropriately notes 
that at least some of the "meaning-making activities of human groups have 
been done without reference to a god or to a supra-natural force" (p. 133). 
Since repeated practice in the accurate and precise use of descriptive and 
analytical language is an important part of the collegiate classroom experi­
ence in the humanities, it is at least "awkward" (p. 133) if not damaging to 
students and their objects of study to categorize wholly secular perspec­
tives on human life as in some ways constituting "spiritualities." Such an 
interpretive move goes well beyond devising a capacious category for pur­
poses of comparison to outright misreading of the primary evidence. To 
make that kind of category mistake is to fail the minimal requirements for 
descriptive adequacy. As the philosopher of religion Wayne Proudfoot puts 
it, "where it is the subject's experience which is the object of study, that 
experience must be identified under a description that can plausibly be at­
tributed to him."2 In simple terms, it is a fundamental distortion of the 
evidence either to claim or to imply that every person has a "spirituality," 
especially, as Pence notes, "when the understanding itself is explicit that 
there is no such thing as a 'spirit'" (p. 133). 
We are happy to hear in Alexander and Helen Astin's response that 
their subsequent studies and reports have recognized the problems inherent 
in measuring the prevalence of "spirituality" by asking questions that em­
ploy versions of the word, and for this reason have shifted to the language 
of "spiritual identification." And the fact, as the Astins suggest, that the 
index displayed a high internal consistency (Alpha = .89) between the 13 
elements of the scale is of course not at all surprising given, as they say, that 
"12 of the 13 items making up this scale included some version of the word 
'spiritual''' (p. 127). Be that as it may, the questions we are asking are not 
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concerned with whether the measure is consistent within itself, but whether 
this consistency tells us anything meaningful about the nature of "spiritual­
ity," or even about what people understand it to mean in any given historical 
moment and ideological climate in the United States. We remain 
unconvinced that all of those who identify with the word "spirituality" un­
derstand it to mean the same thing. And we are therefore, in the language 
of sociologists who specialize in survey methodology, questioning the inter­
rater, or inter-observer, reliability of the study's variables, and especially 
the most central of its variables, i.e., "spirituality." 
Although the Astins detail in their response the careful methods and 
multiple refinements oftheir approach to survey research, it cannot be said 
that the same level of care is evidenced when enthusiasts for "Spirituality in 
Higher Education" declare without hesitance that literally everyone has a 
spirituality.3 In effect, such pronouncements impoverish students' encoun­
ters with the diversity of ways of making sense ofthe world through unwar­
ranted homogenization. They also suggest that teachers and students need 
not take seriously people's own descriptions of and questions about their 
experience and points of view, even as an analytical starting point. That 
stance yields the unsettling prospect of having either a teacher or student 
declare that while person X claims to be an atheist, person X "really" is 
"spiritual." Such an approach to the reading of primary data begs, but does 
nothing to answer, the question of when individuals' descriptions of their 
own experiences and perspectives on the world are to be taken seriously 
and when they are not-and on what bases. Perhaps considering the re­
versed statement can drive the point home. Enthusiasts for "Spirituality in 
Higher Education" seem unwilling to entertain the possibility that person X 
claims to be "spiritual" but is "really" suffering from psychological malad­
aptation. It is difficult indeed to discern how assertions that depend on 
dismissing out of hand first-person testimonies could produce the kind of 
"real infonnation" about actual practices and beliefs that Pence rightly claims 
is the subject matter for the religious studies classroom. The extension of 
"spirituality" to categorize explicitly secular viewpoints obfuscates rather 
than clarifies. At the very least, such an extension indirectly implies that 
secular understandings of the way the world works are somehow underde­
veloped, inferior, diminished, and not worthy of serious, sustained consider­
ation. But in the undergraduate humanities classroom those value judg­
ments should be the topics for discussion and debate, with their supporting 
arguments open to explicit challenge and defense-rather than being treated, 
by implication, as self-evident truths. 
Pence addi 
be a site for ex! 
(p. 135). She VI 
much toward tl 
of the course ir 
the findings ofl 
ing in large stat, 
colleges. In thl 
can stand in SOl 
endorsing a pa 
populations wI 
those in non-CI 
view of the wo 
Another pr 
that is appropri 
taken in other s 
college or univ 
or so classroor 
ture robust Stl 
people who W( 
ing in their cho 
not, raising th( 
maturation" ar 
hands of other 
that Student 1 
"Spirituality in 
appropriate to 
"big questions 
they also brin: 
concept of "sp 
tiny and contt 
Our essays in 
None of u 
students is a p 
lege years are 
we vigorously 
essarily const! 
torical evidenl 
faction big que 
tual" warrant! 
~lf, but whether 
~e of "spiritual­
siven historical 
We remain 
pirituality" un­
n the language 
Jning the inter­
and especially 
I methods and 
cannot be said 
"Spi.rituality in 
~veryone has a 
dents' encoun­
hrough unwar­
I students need 
)fiS about their 
19 point. That 
:her or student 
I X "really" is 
begs, but does 
ptions of their 
lken seriously 
ldering the re­
'Spirituality in 
I that person X 
logical malad­
lat depend on 
Ice the kind of 
:rightly claims 
e extension of 
'uscates rather 
y implies that 
how underde­
.ined consider­
;e value judg­
eir supporting 
l being treated, 
Inutility of "Spirituality" 143 
Pence additionally expresses wariness about calls for the classroom to 
be a site for explicit efforts to promote student ''fonnation and maturation" 
(p. 135). She wonders whether that focus would "weight the classroom too 
much toward the personal life of the student and places the subject matter 
of the course into competition with student needs" (p. 135). On this topic 
the findings of the GTU studies may only be of limited value to those teach­
ing in large state universities, community colleges, or religiously unaffiliated 
colleges. In those venues the originally Christian language of "fonnation" 
can stand in some tension with institutional missions that cannot be seen as 
endorsing a particular religious point of view as well as diverse student 
popUlations where the notion of religious formation may be different for 
those in non-Christian traditions, and alien to those who maintain a secular 
view of the world. 
Another productive question raised by Pence concerns the type of work 
that is appropriate to the classroom and the type of work that is best under­
taken in other settings, and sometimes by other people, in the contemporary 
college or university. What should teachers strive to accomplish in their 45 
or so classroom contact hours in a given semester? Most institutions fea­
ture robust Student Life staffs and substantial counseling services. The 
people who work in those sectors of higher education have extensive train­
ing in their chosen fields and may well have skills that individual teachers do 
not, raising the question of which dimensions of students' "fonnation and 
maturation" are best addressed outside of the classroom and best left in the 
hands of other professionals. It does not appear to be an accident, then, 
that Student Life staff and other administrators are so prominent in the 
"Spirituality in Higher Education" movement. But while they may have the 
appropriate tools to create contexts and guide discussions of some of the 
"big questions," if the literature produced by the movement is any indication 
they also bring with them taken-for-granted conceptions, like the central 
concept of "spirituality," that have rarely been subjected to the careful scru­
tiny and contestation that is the hallmark of the contemporary academy. 
Our essays in this volume have attempted to do just that. 
None of us would deny that the intellectual growth and maturation of 
students is a primary goal of their collegiate experience and that their col­
lege years are an appropriate time for grappling with big questions. What 
we vigorously dispute is that any wrestling with those questions must nec­
essarily constitute a "spirituality." There is ample contemporary and his­
torical evidence that many have succeeded in answering to their own satis­
faction big questions about human life without appealing to religious or "spiri­
tual" warrants. Freud's sweeping dismissal of religious beliefs as wish 
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fulfillments and illusions and his epigrammatic recommendation of "educa­
tion to reality" represent a pointed and memorable example.4 Serious con­
sideration of such secular answers to life's big questions, in comparison to 
traditional religious and contemporary "spiritual" ones, can only enrich col­
legiate conversations about them both in the classroom and outside it. Forced 
conversions of secular viewpoints into putatively "spiritual" ones, and reli­
gious and "spiritual" viewpoints into secular ones, can only impoverish those 
same conversations by promoting a taken-for-granted and unexamined ho­
mogeneity. If training in argument is the sine qua non of undergraduate 
education,5 the fullest possible range of arguments about the answers to big 
questions should be introduced to students so that through the patient and 
detailed work ofcomparison they can, for themselves, evaluate their strengths 
and weakness and develop the ability to defend and extend their own judg­
ments. The premature amalgamation of even atheist perspectives into an 
all-encompassing but amorphous "spirituality" deprives students of the op­
portunities to consider seriously what some people have perceived to be a 
compelling way of understanding life in this world but also of a potential 
whetstone against which they can sharpen their own perspectives. 
Beyond the partiCUlarities of the HERl surveys there are numerous 
historical, individual, institutional, and ideological issues, and it is on those 
issues rather than on the mechanics of survey research that we have fo­
cused all along. We can raise only a few more of those issues in this brief 
response. First, whether it is acknowledged by its partisans or not, the 
contemporary interest in spirituality, often explicitly constructed in opposi­
tion to a distinctive if implicit understanding of what constitutes religion, has 
its own pedigree. Leigh Schmidt describes it as "a historically shaped tradi­
tion of its own" that developed in the 19th century United States among an 
array of religious liberals as "a search for a religious world larger than the 
British Protestant inheritance."6 Schmidt's even-handed appraisal of that 
tradition provides a bracing antidote to the exuberant enthusiasm of some in 
the "Spirituality in Higher Education" movement. He also argues that "spot­
ted with its own failed inclusions, dubious appropriations and misguided causes, 
the Spiritual Left must also know itself as a tradition of mixed blessings."7 
Precisely what is missing in some of the more far-reaching endorsements 
of Spirituality in Higher Education is just that sense of mixed blessings, of 
the benefits and drawbacks, for example, of imputing a "spirituality" to 
those who would wholeheartedly reject the notion. 
Writing from what he calls the "worldly" as opposed to the spiritual 
Left, Roland Boer offers a different history for the contemporary embrace 
of spirituality. He contends that "the rise of spirituality is a major-I hesi­
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tate to write 'first'-sign of the tensions within secularism and the begin­
nings of post-secularism.',g Boer denies that the contemporary fascination 
with spirituality can be traced to a hunger for meaning that is located be­
yond the material, and he argues that the conception of spirituality as prima­
rily a private affair that is, and should be, separate from someone's various 
engagements with the world actually echoes the typical emphases of secu­
larism. Focusing specifically on the Christian Bible, Boer asserts that "the 
assumption that you need to believe in order to be interested in the Bible 
would have to be one of the strangest making the rounds today."9 Follow­
ing Boer's lead, we submit that the assumption that you have to be spiritual 
in order to address life's big questions is at least equally strange. In the 
terms of Pence's response, neither a spiritual nor a secular approach to 
making meaning is a necessary pre-requisite to addressing fundamental 
questions of meaning; nor does addressing fundamental questions of mean­
ing necessarily indicate that one is religious or spiritual. To assert the 
contrary of either position is to deny the diversity of human approaches to 
life's big issues. At a time when diversity of all sorts plays such a prominent 
role in the missions of institutions ofhigher education, that seems ill-advised, 
to say the least. 
Second, Schmidt's location of the genesis of the contemporary em­
brace of spirituality among a group of 191h century liberal Protestants and 
their fellow travelers also provides a context for our concern that the "Spiri­
tuality in Higher Education" movement represents, again whether intention­
ally or not, an effort in the direction of a re-Protestantization of American 
collegiate education. Schmidt identifies the rudiments of the 19lh century 
religious liberalism in which the focus on "spirituality" took shape as the 
following: 
•	 Individual aspiration after mystical experience or reli­
gious feeling 
•	 The valuing of silence, solitude, and serene meditation 
•	 The immanence of the transcendent-in each person 
and in nature 
•	 The cosmopolitan appreciation of religious variety as 
well as unity in diversity 
•	 Ethical earnestness in pursuit of justice-producing re­
forms or "social salvation" 
•	 An emphasis on creative self-expression and adven­
turesome seeking. 1O 
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Clearly, those characteristics of 19mcentury American religious liberalism 
are remarkably congruent with the evocations of "spirituality" that domi­
nate the discourse of the movement to promote Spirituality in Higher Edu­
cation. They also express a distinctively Protestant Christian understanding 
of both religion and "spirituality." We remain very concerned that, should 
such characteristics continue to be unquestioningly accepted as limning the 
outlines of contemporary spirituality, they will in effect reinforce a Protes­
tant hegemony in the discourse about spirituality. Partisans of "Spirituality 
in Higher Education" would do well to attend to the potential exclusionary 
effects of such an unexamined conception of "spirituality" might have for 
those who do not accept or endorse a Protestant way of understanding their 
own ways of making sense of the world, including those who espouse un­
flinchingly secular viewpoints. 
Those who advocate for "Spirituality in Higher Education," and par­
ticularly those implicated and invested in the analysis of HERI survey data 
regarding the spiritual proclivities of college students, might suggest that an 
implicit Protestant emphasis does not hold since contemporary college stu­
dents, in fact, declare themselves to belong to many Christian denomina­
tions and other of the world's religious traditions. Such a plurality of reli­
gious commitment, seemingly demonstrable through empirical data, appears 
to belie a measure of healthy religious diversity among college students. 
One possible conclusion from such a representation is that people across 
religious traditions are concerned with "spirituality." Herein resides an im­
portant analytical problem with which people who study and teach religion 
professionally are rightly concerned. We contend that the criteria and as­
sumptions infused into assertions about spirituality and religion betray an 
unarticulated Protestant Christian framework that is presented as natural, 
inevitable, and universal--even as it deploys a modicum of rhetoric toward 
vaguely valuing religious pluralism. As Tomoko Masuzawa has recently 
argued, the very idea of "world religions" developed from European pro­
cesses ofcomparison and classification according to relationships with Prot­
estant Christianity at a particular historical moment in northern Europe, and 
discourses invoking religious pluralism and multiculturalism often reify Prot­
estant assumptions while simultaneously hiding them.11 Following Masuzawa, 
let us reiterate here that the point is not whether proponents of "Spirituality 
in Higher Education" name their latent, or not-so-Iatent, Protestantism. The 
point, for teachers and researchers in religious studies, is precisely that 
these researchers and interpreters do not do such naming, thus allowing 
Protestant presuppositions to shape the discourse on "spirituality," even across 
religious traditions-a range of traditions that are themselves defined, cat­
egorized, and e 
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egorized, and evaluated in relationship to hegemonic conceptions of "spiri­
tuality" and "religion." 
Such a circular process has the appearance of what philosopher Jean 
BaudriIlard famously called "the hyperreal"-that is to say, a system of 
signs and significations referring only to themselves in their own closed 
semantic universe, producing a map so detailed that it covers, erases, and 
replaces the actual terrain it is meant to represent. l2 In this case the actual 
terrain of people's provisional and relational conceptions of themselves and 
the world, and real questions thereof, has been mapped over by a simulacrum 
of "spirituality"-and, perhaps, a simulacrum of higher education as well. 
Furthermore, attempts to close the system within the discourse of "Spiritu­
ality in Higher Education," evidenced by significant rhetorical maneuvers 
attempting to preclude the possibility of critical appraisal and intervention, 
serve the ideological function of suggesting that nothing lies outside of that 
discourse-which is in itself a clue as to the discourse's embedded Protes­
tant universalism. I) 
Third, we noted in our individual contributions that the "Spirituality in 
Higher Education" movement advocates far-reaching changes in Ameri­
can higher education. In addition to raising questions about the appropriate 
division of responsibility for aspects of student development in contempo­
rary colleges and universities, Dena Pence has aptly pointed out some of 
the ways in which those changes might impact a religious studies class­
room. Her concern about how strong interest in students' "formation and 
maturation" might displace the designated subject matter of a course (see 
p. 9) is well-founded and clearly articulated. One of the things that is still 
missing in the broad programmatic statements in favor of introjecting "spiri­
tuality" into higher education is precisely how that is to be done in specific 
courses, offered within the constraints of particular programmatic and insti­
tutional contexts, by faculty members with certain kinds of expertise. Since 
it may appear self-evident to some that courses in the study of religion may 
address big questions or issues of "spirituality," and that the religion class­
room is a logical place for the implementation of a curriculum focused on 
"spirituality," that does not excuse the proponents of "Spirituality in Higher 
Education" from explaining in some detail just how treatments of those 
broad topics within specific courses are to be used to promote student for­
mation and maturation, without turning students' away from the subject 
matter at hand and towards, only or primarily, their own appropriation or 
rejection of it. More challenging, perhaps, is figuring out the actual role of 
the chemistry teacher or elementary foreign language instructor in carrying 
out a lightly outlined program to promote spirituality among college 
students. 
i 
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Finally, efforts to promote spirituality in collegiate life raise difficult and 
contentious ideological questions. The most far-reaching promoters of "Spiri­
tuality in Higher Education," when they sometimes claim directly and other 
times imply that everyone is in some way spiritual, appear to be indirectly 
mounting a case against all secular views of the world and critiques of 
religion, be they inspired by Marx, Freud, or anyone else. The assertion that 
even atheists possess a "spirituality" is simply a convoluted way of assert­
ing that secular views of the world hold no credibility, cannot be taken to 
mean what they actually say, and can be dismissed out of hand. There may 
even be echoes of a distant but distinct religious or at least "spiritual" 
triumphalism that longs to trumpet the demise of the secular. At its core, 
then, the "Spirituality in Higher Education" movement would represent a 
politics by another name. If so, we ask only that its politics be clearly 
declared and opened to the kind of careful, patient, and probing consider­
ation that represents American higher education at its best. 
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